The Deal Was Working. We Fixed It Into a War.
The 2015 nuclear agreement verifiably constrained Iran’s enrichment. The U.S. withdrew, enrichment accelerated, a war was fought — and the outcome is still disputed.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action imposed the most intrusive nuclear monitoring ever applied to a non-weapons state. Iran’s enrichment was capped at 3.67%, its centrifuge inventory cut by roughly two-thirds, and its enriched-uranium stockpile reduced by about 98%. Inspectors gained expanded access plus real-time seals and online monitoring.1 The IAEA confirmed Iran was meeting its commitments.
The deal’s critics were not satisfied: it did not cover ballistic missiles, sanctions relief could fund proxies, and key limits carried sunset dates. In May 2018 the U.S. withdrew and reimposed sanctions under "maximum pressure," promising a better deal.2 None was concluded. A later attempt to return to the deal also collapsed. By 2024 Iran was enriching to 60% — a level with no civilian justification — and the IAEA chief warned it held enough near-weapons-grade material for several bombs if further enriched.3
In June 2025, with talks stalled and Israel assessing Iran as near a breakout, Israel launched a large air campaign against Iran’s nuclear and missile sites beginning June 13.4 On June 21–22 the U.S. ran Operation Midnight Hammer: B-2 bombers dropped fourteen 30,000-pound bunker-busters on Fordow and Natanz, with cruise missiles at Isfahan.4 The president declared the program "completely and fully obliterated." A ceasefire ended the so-called Twelve-Day War on June 24.
The damage was real — collapsed tunnels, wrecked centrifuge halls. But a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment circulated within days reached a different conclusion than the one announced: the program was set back by months, not eliminated, and some highly enriched uranium had been moved before the strikes.5 The White House disputed the finding; the president publicly contradicted his own intelligence director.5
Verification then collapsed. The IAEA had already lost "continuity of knowledge" before the strikes; afterward it withdrew inspectors, and Iran barred access to the attacked sites.6 As of mid-2026 the world cannot independently confirm Iran’s remaining stockpile or how far the program has been rebuilt. Commercial satellite imagery shows tunneling near Natanz being reinforced rather than abandoned.7
The arms-control retrospective is unglamorous: any workable alternative would face the same problems the original deal addressed — enrichment limits, verification, sunsets — except Iran now negotiates from a far larger, more advanced, hardened, and partly clandestine program, with international oversight in its worst shape in two decades.2
"A new U.S. intelligence report found that Iran’s nuclear program has been set back only a few months — and was not ‘completely and fully obliterated.’"— PBS NewsHour, June 25, 2025
References & Citations
- Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation — "The Iran Deal, Then and Now," armscontrolcenter.org.
- RAND Corporation — "The Revenge of the JCPOA," rand.org, May 4, 2025.
- Arms Control Association — "Iran Accelerates Highly Enriched Uranium Production," armscontrol.org, Feb 2024.
- The War Zone — "B-2 Strikes On Iran: What We Know About Operation Midnight Hammer," twz.com, June 2025.
- PBS NewsHour — "Intelligence report suggests Iran’s program only set back by months," pbs.org, June 25, 2025.
- Chatham House — "The IAEA and Iran reached an agreement on inspections — but it’s already in trouble," chathamhouse.org, Sept 2025.
- CSIS — "What Operation Midnight Hammer Means for the Future of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions," csis.org.